Allied prosecutors used torture to help prove their case at
Nuremberg and other postwar trials. (note 72)
Former Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Höss was tortured by British
officials into signing a false and self-incriminating
"confession" that has been widely cited as a key
document of Holocaust extermination. His testimony before the
Nuremberg Tribunal, a high point of the proceeding, was perhaps
the most striking and memorable evidence presented there of a
German extermination program. (note 73) Höss maintained that two
and half million people had been killed in Auschwitz gas
chambers, and that another 500,000 inmates had died there of
other causes. No serious or reputable historian now accepts
either of these fantastic figures, and other key portions of
Höss' "confession" are now generally acknowledged to
be untrue. (note 74)
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has cited the case of Jupp Aschenbrenner,
a Bavarian who was tortured into signing a statement that he had
worked on mobile gas chambers ("gas vans") during the
war. It wasn't until several years later that he was finally able
to prove that he had actually spent that time in Munich studying
to become an electric welder. (note 75)
Fritz Sauckel, head of the German wartime labor mobilization
program, was sentenced to death at the main Nuremberg trial. An
important piece of evidence presented to the Tribunal by the US
prosecution was an affidavit signed by the defendant. (Nuremberg
document 3057-PS.) It turned out that Sauckel had put his
signature to this self-incriminating statement, which had been
presented to him by his captors in finished form, only after he
was bluntly told that if he hesitated, his wife and children
would be turned over to the Soviets. "I did not stop to
consider, and thinking of my family, I signed the document,"
Sauckel later declared. (note 76)
Hans Fritzsche, another defendant in the main Nuremberg trial,
was similarly forced to sign a self-damning confession while he
was a prisoner of the Soviet secret police in Moscow. (Nuremberg
document USSR-474.) (note 77)
Nuremberg defendant Julius Streicher, who was eventually hanged
because he published a sometimes sensational anti-Jewish weekly
paper, was brutally mistreated following his arrest. He was badly
beaten, kicked, whipped, spat at, forced to drink saliva and
burned with cigarettes. His genitals were beaten. Eyebrow and
chest hair was pulled out. He was stripped and photographed.
Fellow defendant Hans Frank was savagely beaten by two black GIs
shortly after his arrest. August Eigruber, former Gauleiter of
Upper Austria, was mutilated and castrated at the end of the war.
(note 78)
Josef Kramer, former commandant of both the BergenBelsen and
Auschwitz-Birkenau camps, and other defendants in the British-run
"Belsen" trial, were reportedly also tortured, some of
them so brutally that they begged to be put to death. (note 79)
Although most of the defendants at the main Nuremberg trial were
not tortured, many other Germans were forced to sign affidavits
and give testimony against their former colleagues and superiors.
A simple threat to turn the subject over to the Soviets was often
enough to persuade him to sign an affidavit or provide testimony
needed in court. Threats against the subject's wife and children,
including withdrawal of ration cards, delivery to the Soviets or
imprisonment, often quickly produced the desired results. If all
else failed, the subject could be placed in solitary confinement,
beaten, kicked, whipped or burned until he broke down. (note 80)
The testimony of the prosecution's chief witness in the Nuremberg
"Wilhelmstrasse" trial was obtained by threat of death.
The American defense attorney, Warren Magee, had somehow obtained
the transcript of the first pretrial interrogation of Friedrich
Gaus, a former senior official in the German Foreign Office.
Despite frantic protests by prosecuting attorney Robert Kempner,
the judge decided to permit Magee to read from the document.
During the pretrial interrogation session, Kempner told Gaus that
he would be turned over to the Soviets for hanging. Tearfully
pleading for mercy, Gaus begged Kempner to think of his wife and
children. Kempner replied that he could save himself only by
testifying in court against his former colleagues. A desperate
Gaus, who had already endured four weeks in solitary confinement,
agreed. When Magee finished reading from the damning transcript,
Gaus sat with both hands to his face, totally devastated. (note
81)
American soldiers repeatedly beat former SS captain Konrad Morgen
in an unsuccessful effort to force him to sign a perjured
affidavit against Ilse Koch, a defendant in the US military's
1947 "Buchenwald" case. American officials also
threatened to turn Morgen over to the Soviets if he did not sign
the false statement. (note 82)
Luftwaffe General Field Marshal Erhard Milch was warned by a US
Army Major to stop testifying on behalf of Hermann Göring in the
main Nuremberg trial. The American officer told Milch that if he
persisted, he would be charged as a war criminal himself,
regardless of whether or not he was guilty. (note 83) Milch did
not back down and was indeed charged. In 1947 a US Nuremberg
court sentenced him to life imprisonment as a war criminal. Four
years later, though, the US High Commissioner commuted his
sentence to fifteen years, and a short time after that Milch was
amnestied and released. (note 84)
Reports of widespread torture at the postwar American-run
"war crimes" trials at Dachau leaked out, resulting in
so many protests that a formal investigation was eventually
carried out. A US Army Commission of inquiry consisting of
Pennsylvania Judge Edward van Roden and Texas Supreme Court Judge
Gordon Simpson officially confirmed the charges of gross abuse.
German defendants, they found, were routinely tortured at Dachau
with savage beatings, burning matches under fingernails, kicking
of testicles, months of solitary confinement, and threats of
family reprisals. Low ranking prisoners were assured that their
"confessions" would be used only against their former
superiors in the dock. Later, though, these hapless men found
their own "confessions" used against them when they
were tried in turn. High ranking defendants were cynically
assured that by "voluntarily" accepting all
responsibility themselves they would thereby protect their former
subordinates from prosecution.85
One Dachau trial court reporter was so outraged at what was
happening there in the name of justice that he quit his job. He
testified to a US Senate subcommittee that the "most
brutal" interrogators had been three German-born Jews.
Although operating procedures at the Dachau trials were
significantly worse than those used at Nuremberg, they give some
idea of the spirit of the "justice" imposed on the
vanquished Germans.
Virtually all of the US investigators who brought cases before
American military courts at Dachau were "Jewish refugees
from Germany" who "hated the Germans," recalled
Joseph Halow, a US Army court reporter at the Dachau trials in
1947. "Many of the investigators gave vent to their hated by
attempting to force confessions from the Germans by treating them
brutally," including "severe beatings."86
The case of Gustav Petrat, a German who had served as a guard at
the Mauthausen, was not unusual. After repeated brutal beatings
by US authorities, he broke down and signed a perjured statement.
He was also whipped and threatened with immediate shooting.
Petrat was prevented from securing exonerating evidence, and even
potential defense witnesses were beaten and threatened to keep
them from testifying. After a farcical trial by a US military
court at Dachau, Petrat was sentenced to death and hanged in late
1948. He was 24 years old.87
Use of torture to produce incriminating statements has not been
limited to postwar Germany, of course. Such techniques have been
systematically used by governments around the world. During the
Korean War, American airmen held as prisoners by the Communist
North Koreans made detailed statements "confessing" to
their roles in waging germ warfare. Under physical and
psychological torture, 38 US airmen "admitted" dropping
bacteriological bombs that caused disease epidemics and claimed
many Korean civilian lives. These statements were later shown to
be false, and the airmen repudiated them after returning to the
United States. Their phony confessions were the same kind of
evidence given by Rudolf H_ss and others at the Nuremberg trials.
Under similar circumstances, Americans proved at least as ready
to "confess" to monstrous but baseless crimes as
Germans.88
One of the most important and revealing Nuremberg cases is that
of Oswald Pohl, the wartime head of the vast SS agency (WVHA)
that ran the German concentration camps. After his capture in
1946, he was taken to Nenndorf where British soldiers tied him to
a chair and beat him unconscious. He lost two teeth in repeated
beatings.89 He was then transferred to Nuremberg, where American
military officials intensively interrogated him for more than
half a year in sessions that lasted for hours. Altogether there
were about 70 such sessions. During this period he had no access
to an attorney or any other help. He was never formally charged
with anything, nor even told precisely why he was being
interrogated.
In a statement written after he was sentenced to death at
Nuremberg in November 1947 by the American military court
("Concentration Camp" Case No. 4), Pohl described his
treatment.90 He reported that although he was generally not
physically mistreated in Nuremberg as he had been at Nenndorf, he
was nevertheless subjected to the less noticeable but, as he put
it, "in their own way much more brutal emotional
tortures."
American interrogators (most of them Jews) accused Pohl of
killing 30 million people and of condemning ten million people to
death. The interrogators themselves knew very well that such
accusations were lies and tricks meant to break down his
resistance, Pohl declared. "Because I am not emotionally
thick-skinned, these diabolical intimidations were not without
effect, and the interrogators achieved what they wanted: not the
truth, but rather statements that served their needs," he
wrote.
Pohl was forced to sign false and self-incriminating affidavits
written by prosecution officials that were later used against him
in his own trial. As he recalled:
Whenever genuine documents did not correspond to what the prosecution authorities wanted or were insufficient for the guilty sentences they sought, "affidavits" were put together. The most striking feature of these remarkable trial documents is that the accused often condemned themselves in them. That is understandable only to those who have themselves experienced the technique by which such "affidavits" are obtained.
He and other defendants were "destroyed" with these
affidavits, which "contain provable errors of fact regarding
essential points," Pohl wrote. Among the false statements
signed by Pohl was one that incriminated former Reichsbank
President Walter Funk, whom the Nuremberg Tribunal eventually
sentenced to life imprisonment.91
American officials also made use of false witnesses at Nuremberg,
Pohl wrote:
Whenever these productions [affidavits] were not enough to produce the result sought by the prosecuting authorities, they marched out their so-called 'star witnesses,' or rather, paid witnesses . . . A whole string of these shady, wretched characters played their contemptible game at Nuremberg. They included high government officials, generals and intellectuals as well as prisoners, mental defectives and real hardened criminals . . . During the WVHA trial [of Pohl] a certain Otto appeared from a mental institution as a "star witness." His previous lifestyle would have been considered exemplary by any hardened criminal. The same is true of prosecution witness Krusial who presented the most spectacular fairy tales to the court under oath, which were naturally believed . . .
Pohl also protested that defense attorneys were not allowed free access to the German wartime documents, which the prosecution was able to find and use without hindrance:
For almost two years the prosecution authorities could make whatever use they wanted of the many crates of confiscated documentary and archival material they had at their disposal. But the same access right was refused to the German defendants despite their repeated efforts . . . This meant a tremendous or even complete paralysis and hindrance of the defense cases for the accused, for those crates also contained the exonerating material that the prosecution authorities were able to keep from being presented to the court. And that is called "proper" procedure.
Because Pohl held the rank of general in the German armed forces,
his treatment by the British and Americans was illegal according
to the international agreements on the treatment of prisoners of
war.
"As result of the brutal physical mistreatment in Nenndorf
and my treatment in Nuremberg, I was emotionally a completely
broken man," he wrote. "I was 54 years old. For 33
years I had served by country without dishonor, and I was
unconscious of any crime."
Pohl summed up the character of the postwar trials of German
leaders:
It was obvious during the Dachau trials, and it also came out unmistakably and only poorly disguised during the Nuremberg trials, that the prosecution authorities, among whom Jews predominated, were driven by blind hatred and obvious lust for revenge. Their goal was not the search for truth but rather the annihilation of as many adversaries as possible.
To an old friend Pohl wrote: "As one of the senior SS
leaders I had never expected to be left unmolested. No more,
however, did I expect a death sentence. It is a sentence of
retribution."92
He was hanged on June 7, 1951. In his final plea to the Nuremberg
court, Pohl expressed his faith that one day blind hysteria would
give way to just understanding:93
After distance and time have clarified all events and when
passion has ceased and when hatred and revenge have stilled their
hunger, then these many millions of decent Germans who have
sacrificed their lives for their fatherland will not be denied
their share of sympathy which today is being attributed to the
victims of the concentration camps, although a large number of
them owe their fate not to political, racial or religious
characteristics, but to their criminal past.
Along with the millions of people around the world who avidly
followed the Nuremberg proceedings by radio and newspaper, the
defendants themselves were shocked by the evidence presented to
substantiate the extermination charge. Above all, the testimony
of Auschwitz commandant Rudolf H_ss and Einsatzgruppen commander
Otto Ohlendorf made a deep impression. Contrary to what is often
claimed or insinuated, however, the Nuremberg Tribunal defendants
declared that they did not know of any extermination program
during the war.94 These men were, in a sense, the first
"Holocaust revisionists."
The main Nuremberg defendant, Hermann Göring, who had been
Hitler's second-in-command and designated successor during most
of the Third Reich years, vehemently denied knowing of any
extermination program during the war. "The first time I
learned of these terrible exterminations," he exclaimed at
one point, "was right here in Nuremberg." The German
policy had been to expel the Jews, not kill them, he explained,
and added that, to the best of his knowledge, Hitler did not know
of any extermination policy either.95
During a rare unguarded break between court sessions, fellow
defendant Hans Fritzsche privately asked Göring about the truth
of the extermination charge. The former Reichsmarschall solemnly
assured Fritzsche that the accusation was not true. The Allied
evidence for the charge, he insisted, was inaccurate or
incomplete and totally contradicted everything he knew about the
matter. In any case, Göring added, if there had been any mass
killings, they certainly were not ordered by Hitler.96
General Alfred Jodl, chief of the operations staff of the Armed
Forces High Command, and probably Hitler's closest military
adviser, gave similar testimony to the Tribunal. Responding to a
direct question about this matter, he said:97
I can only say, fully conscious of my responsibility, that I
never heard, either by hint or by written or spoken words, of an
extermination of Jews . . . I never had any private information
on the extermination of the Jews. On my word, as sure as I am
sitting here, I heard all these things for the first time after
the end of the war.
Hans Frank, the wartime governor of German-ruled Poland,
testified that during the war he had heard only rumors and
foreign reports of mass killings of Jews. He asked other
officials, including Hitler, about these stories and was
repeatedly assured that they were false.98
Frank's testimony is particularly noteworthy because if millions
of Jews had actually been exterminated in Germanoccupied Poland,
as alleged, hardly anyone would have been in a better position to
know about it. During the course of the trial, Frank was overcome
by a deep sense of Christian repentance. His psychological state
was such that if he had known about an extermination program, he
would have said so.
At one point during the proceedings, Frank was asked by his
attorney, "Did you ever take part in any way in the
annihilation of Jews?" His reply reflects his emotional
state at the time:99
I say yes, and the reason why I say yes is because, under the
impression of these five months of the proceedings, and
especially under the impression of the testimony of the witness
[former Auschwitz commandant] H_ss, I cannot answer to my
conscience to shift the responsibility for this solely on these
low-level people. I never built a Jewish extermination camp or
helped to bring one into existence. But if Adolf Hitler
personally shifted this terrible responsibility onto his people,
than it also applies to me. After all, we carried on this
struggle against Jewry for years . . . And therefore I have the
duty to answer your question in this sense and in this context
with yes. A thousand years will pass and this guilt of Germany
will not be erased.
These words, and especially the final sentence, have often been
quoted to give the impression that the defendants themselves
admitted their guilt and acknowledged the existence of a wartime
German policy to exterminate the Jews.100 Less well-known are
Frank's words during his final address to the Tribunal:101
In the witness stand I said that a thousand years would not be
enough to erase the guilt of our nation because of Hitler's
behavior in this war. [However,] not only the behavior of our
wartime enemies against our people and our soldiers, which has
been carefully kept out of these proceedings, but also the
enormous mass crimes of the most terrible kind against Germans,
which I have only now learned about, especially in East Prussia,
Silesia, Pomerania and in the Sudetenland, which have been and
are still being carried out by Russians, Poles and Czechs, have
now already completely canceled out any possible guilt of our
people. Who will ever judge these crimes against the German
people?
Ernst Kaltenbrunner, wartime head of the powerful Reich Security
Main Office (RSHA), was certain that he would soon be put to
death regardless of the evidence presented to the Tribunal:
"The colonel in charge of the London prison that I was in
has told me that I would be hanged in any case, no matter what
the outcome would be. Since I am fully aware of that, all I want
to do is to clear up on the fundamental things that are wrong
here." In a question-and-answer exchange, Kaltenbrunner
rejected the charge that he had ordered gassings:102
Q. Witness after witness, by testimony and affidavit, has said that the gas chamber killings were done on general or specific orders of Kaltenbrunner.
A. Show me one of those men or any of those orders. It is utterly impossible.
Q. . . Practically all of the orders came through Kaltenbrunner.
A. Entirely impossible.
The case of Albert Speer, one-time Hitler confidant and
wartime Armaments Minister, deserves special mention. His
Nuremberg defense strategy was unique and also rather successful
because he did not hang. While maintaining that he personally
knew nothing of an extermination program during the war, he
nevertheless declared himself morally culpable for having worked
so diligently for a regime he belatedly came to regard as evil.
After serving a twenty-year sentence in Spandau prison, the
"repentant Nazi" was "rehabilitated" by the
mass media for his somewhat subtle but fervent condemnation of
the Hitler regime. His contrite memoir, published in the US as
Inside the Third Reich, was highly acclaimed and sold very
profitably in Europe and America.
Until his death in 1981, Speer steadfastly insisted that he did
not know of any extermination program or gassings during the war.
His position was remarkable because, if a wartime policy to
exterminate the Jews had actually existed, almost no one would
have been in a better position to have known about it. As Reich
Armaments Minister, Speer was responsible for the continental
mobilization of all available resources, including critically
needed Jewish workers. That millions of Jews could have been
transported across Europe and killed at a wartime industrial
center as important as Auschwitz, and elsewhere, without Speer's
knowledge simply defies belief.103
During the Nuremberg "Wilhelmstrasse" trial, the chief
of the Reich Chancellery from 1933 to 1945, Hans Lammers, was
asked if he "was still of the opinion that no program for
exterminating the Jews was ever set up." He answered:
"Yes, I am of that opinion. At least the program never came
to my attention. The program cannot have been set up."
Lammers, who was Hitler's closest legal adviser, went on the
explain: "I did not know of any mass killings and, of the
cases I heard about, the reports were allegations, rumors . . .
The fact that individual cases occurred here and there, the
shooting of Jews in wartime in some towns or other, that I read
something about that and heard something about that, that is very
easily possible."104
Such testimony by the men who were most familiar with Germany's
overall Jewish policy is routinely dismissed as brazen lying. But
the categorical and self-consistent nature of this testimony,
sometimes by men who knew that death soon awaited them, suggests
a core of truth. On the other hand, to accept the Holocaust
extermination story means giving greater credibility to the most
fantastic and often demonstrably false testimonies by very
questionable witnesses.
Other Postwar Trials
During the decades since Nuremberg, many individuals have been
tried in (West) Germany and other countries for alleged wartime
participation in exterminating the Jews. Rarely, if ever, has a
defendant ever substantially challenged the Holocaust story. The
accused invariably adopted the defense strategy successfully used
by Speer at Nuremberg: He accepted the extermination story but
denied or minimized his own personal involvement. To deny an
extermination program in trials that were organized on the
working assumption that such a program existed would have been
judicial suicide.
These trials are comparable in some respects to the Soviet show
trials of 1936-1938. The defendants in the well-publicized Moscow
trials never denied the existence of vast criminal conspiracies
involving major Soviet personalities who supposedly plotted the
most horrible crimes in league with hostile foreign powers.
Instead, the accused pleaded that he was not personally guilty,
or that his guilt was minimal and that he had truly repented.
(Remarkably, even foreign observers who should have known better,
such as US Ambassador in Moscow Joseph Davies, were inclined to
accept the Stalinist show trials as genuine and essentially
just.)105
Comparisons have also been drawn between the
"Holocaust" trials and the witchcraft trials of past
centuries. Those accused of witchcraft never denied the existence
or diabolical power of witches. Instead they insisted that they
were not personally guilty of the charges against them. Nuremberg
defendant Hans Fritzsche, who had been one of Germany's most
prominent and effective wartime radio news commentators, summed
up the problem: "If someone accuses me of killing someone,
than I can prove the contrary. But if I am accused of being the
devil, there's no way to disprove that, because it can't be
done."106
One of the most important of the post-Nuremberg
"Holocaust" trials was the 1963-1965 Frankfurt
"Auschwitz" trial of 22 former Auschwitz SS men. The
lengthy case received worldwide media coverage and assumed
something of the character of a show trial.107 Deciding the guilt
or innocence of the defendants was "extraordinarily
difficult," the judges declared in their verdict, because of
the very inconclusive nature of the evidence. "We have no
absolute evidence for the individual killings. We have only the
witness testimonies." The judges acknowledged that "the
possibilities of verifying the witness declarations were very
limited." The judges further emphasized "this weakness
of witness testimony" by citing the case of a Buchenwald
official convicted of murdering an inmate who later turned up
alive.108
This situation was embarrassingly underscored during the trial
when former inmate Rudolf Kauer suddenly repudiated earlier
statements about his one-time SS masters. In pre-trial
interrogation he claimed to have seen defendant Wilhelm Boger
brutally beat a naked Polish woman with a horse whip, ripping off
one breast and flooding a room with blood. When asked to repeat
his statement in court, Kauer admitted: "I lied about that.
That was just a yarn going around the camp. I never saw it . .
." Another claim that Boger had smashed an infant's skull
against a tree trunk was also not true, he confessed. Although
Boger was not liked, Kauer told the court, he was actually a just
SS man.
Another defendant, Klaus Dylewski, whom Kauer had called
"one of the worse killers" at Auschwitz, was actually
"harmless." All of his pre-trial accusations were lies,
Kauer said, calmly adding: "You can punish me if you want. I
am used to that." After the presiding judge admonished him
several times for repudiating his earlier statements, Kauer
replied: "We don't need to lose any more words. It's not
worth it. What I say now is the truth."109
Former Auschwitz camp adjutant and SS Captain Robert Mulka, the
main defendant in the trial, was pronounced guilty of
participation in mass murder and sentenced to 14 years at hard
labor, a verdict that many outsiders considered outrageously
lenient. But less than four months later Mulka was quietly
released, an outcome that should astonish only those not familiar
with the nature of such trials.110
Very few of those who glibly refer to "all the Nuremberg
evidence" as proof for the Holocaust extermination story are
familiar with either the real nature of this "evidence"
or the character of these trials. On closer examination, solid
documentary or forensic evidence of a wartime German policy to
exterminate Europe's Jews proves to be elusive. As we have seen,
the evidence that has been presented consists largely of extorted
confessions, spurious testimonies, and fraudulent documents. The
postwar Nuremberg trials were politically motivated proceedings
meant more to discredit the leaders of a defeated regime than to
establish truth.
We do not need trials or "confessions" to prove that
the Katyn massacre or the postwar deportation of Germans from
eastern and central Europe actually took place. By comparison,
the Holocaust story does not claim just a few isolated massacres,
but a vast extermination program taking place across the European
continent over a three-year period involving several governments
and millions of people. The fact that the Holocaust story must
rely so heavily on highly dubious testimony evidence and trials
staged in a historically unparalleled atmosphere of hysteria,
intimidation and propaganda demonstrates its inherent weakness.
1. Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the
Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression
(11 vols.), Washington, DC: U.S. Govt., 1946-1948. (The "red
series.") / NC&A, Vol. 1, pp. 134-135.
2. International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal. 42 vols.
Nuremberg: 1947-1949. (The "blue series.") / IMT, vol.
19, p. 501.
3. See the succinct declaration by all the German defense
attorneys in the IMT case. Published in: Jay W. Baird, ed., From
Nuremberg to My Lai (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1972), pp.
81-83.; Note also the summary comment by Hans Lammers of the
Nuremberg verdict against him, in: Georg Franz-Willing, Die
Reichskanzlei 1933-1945 (T_bingen: 1984), p. 221.
4. Werner Maser, Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial (New York:
Scribner's, 1979), pp. 281, 282.; The liberal American weekly
Nation editorially acknowledged in October 1945: "The
Nuremberg court is political court with a political job to
perform." Nation, Oct. 27, 1945, p. 418. Quoted in: James J.
Martin, Revisionist Viewpoints (Colorado Springs: 1971), p. 125.
5. International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War
Criminals... ("blue series"), IMT, Vol. 19, p. 398.
(Testimony of July 26, 1946).; In a letter to his wife, written
shortly before his execution, former Foreign Minister Joachim von
Ribbentrop commented: "Everyone knows that the [guilty]
verdict is utterly untenable, but I was once Adolf Hitler's
Foreign Minister and politics demands that for this fact I shall
be condemned." Quoted in: Joachim C. Fest, The Face of the
Third Reich (New York: 1970), p. 185.
6. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990), p. 92.
7. Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to
the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945
(Washington, DC: US State Dept., 1949), pp. 104-106, 303.;
Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg
(Dallas: S.M.U. Press, 1954), pp. 16-17.; Leo Kahn, Nuremberg
Trials (New York: Ballantine, 1972), p. 26.
8. Nahum Goldmann, The Jewish Paradox (New York: 1978), p. 122.;
N. Goldmann, The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann (New York:
1969), pp. 216-217.; WJC official Rabbi Maurice Perlzweig claimed
in 1949 that "it was the WJC which had secured the holding
of the Nuremberg Trials . . ." See: "W.J.C. Claims: The
Nuremberg Trials," Jewish Chronicle (London), Dec. 16, 1949,
p. 17. See also confirmatory letter by Zelmanovits in: Jewish
Chronicle, Dec. 30, 1949, p. 16. Note also: Milton R. Konvitz,
"Will Nuremberg Serve Justice?," Commentary (New York),
Vol. I, No. 3, January 1946, p. 11.
9. World Jewish Congress, Unity in Dispersion (New York: WJC,
1948), pp. 141, 264, 266, 267.
10. Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (New York: Harper &
Row, 1983), pp. 10-13; Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at
Nuremberg (New York: Basic, 1977), pp. 26-33. Tom Bower, Blind
Eye to Murder (London: 1983), pp. 116 f. On the other hand,
American-Jewish newspaper publisher Joseph Pulitzer did not favor
such trials. In May 1945 he urged that 1.5 million leading
Germans should be simply be summarily shot. The New York Times,
May 23, 1945, p. 11.
11. Arthur R. Butz, The Hoax of the Twentieth Century (IHR,
1983), pp. 27-30, 100. Sources cited: Ted Berkman, Cast a Giant
Shadow (1962); "War Crimes" article written by Marcus
in Britannica Book of the Year, 1947, pp. 819-21; Encyclopaedia
Judaica, vol. 11, p. 945; Saturday Evening Post, Dec. 4, 1948, p.
179. See also: R. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (1983), p. 11.
12. Hal Foust, "Nazi Trial Judge Rips 'Injustice',"
Chicago Tribune, Feb. 23, 1948, pp. 1, 2.
13. Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (New
York: Viking, 1956), p. 716.
14. Congressional Record - Appendix, Vol. 95, Sec. 14, (June 15,
1949), p. A 3741.
15. Congressional Record - House, Vol. 93, Sec. 9, (Nov. 28,
1947), p. 10938. Also quoted in: W. Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg
(1970), p. 83.
16. Delivered at Kenyon College, Ohio, Oct. 5, 1946. Vital
Speeches of the Day, Nov. 1, 1946, p. 47. Text also published in:
Jay W. Baird, ed., From Nuremberg to My Lai (Lexington, Mass.: D.
C. Heath, 1972), pp. 107-113. See also: William Bosch, Judgment
on Nuremberg (1970), pp. 73-81. Taft's devotion to principle
during a time of widespread anti-German hysteria impressed John
F. Kennedy, who praised the Ohio senator's stand in his
award-winning best seller, Profiles in Courage.
17. M. R. Konvitz, "Will Nuremberg Serve Justice?,"
Commentary, January 1946 (Vol. I, No. 3), p. 11.
18. H. K. Thompson and H. Strutz, eds., Doenitz at Nuremberg: A
Reappraisal (IHR, 1983), p. 196.
19. H. K. Thompson and H. Strutz, eds., Doenitz at Nuremberg
(1983), pp. 194-195. Similarly, British Admiral Sir Barry
Domville, former Director of British Naval Intelligence and
President of the Royal Naval College, stated: "Anybody who
was a victim of the iniquitous Nuremberg Trials has my deep
sympathy. I am only surprised that so many reputable men in both
our countries were found willing to take part in such a travesty
of justice . . . The Nuremberg Trials leave an indelible blot
upon the reputations of all countries which took part in
them." (H. K. Thompson and H. Strutz, eds., Doenitz at
Nuremberg, p. 164.)
20. Henry Fairlie, "How the Good War Went Bad," The New
Republic, May 20, 1985, pp. 18 ff.
21. Henry L. Stimson, who had served as US Secretary of War,
19401945, wrote in 1947: ". . . In the judgment of Nuremberg
there is affirmed the central principle of peace . . . A standard
has been raised to which Americans, at least, must repair; for it
is only as this standard is accepted, supported and enforced that
we can move onward to a world of law and peace." Quoted in:
Jay W. Baird, ed., From Nuremberg to My Lai (Lexington, Mass.: D.
C. Heath, 1972), p. 125. Nuremberg Tribunal defendant Alfred
Rosenberg declared: "I frankly welcome the idea that a crime
of genocide is to be outlawed by international agreement and
placed under the severest penalties . . ." International
Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals . . .
("blue series"), IMT, vol. 22, p. 382.
22. W. Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg (1970), p. 189.
23. Werner Maser, Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial (1979), pp. 69,
302 (n. 23). See also: James McMillan, Five Men at Nuremberg
(London: 1985), pp. 412-413.
24. See: Ulrich Stern, ed., Die wahren Schuldigen am zweiten
Weltkrieg (Munich: 1990).
25. Jackson letter to Truman, Oct. 12, 1945. State Department
files. Quoted in: R. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (1983), p. 68.
26. Constantine FitzGibbon, Denazification (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1969), pp. 71-72.
27. "Behind the scenes at Nuremberg," Daily Telegraph
(London), Jan. 27, 1977, p. 19.; J. McMillan, Five Men at
Nuremberg (1985), pp. 245, 414.
28. See: Richard H. Minear, Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War
Crimes Trial (Tokyo: C. Tuttle, 1984), p. 57.
29. M. Vozlenski, Der Spiegel, Oct. 6, 1986 (No. 41), pp. 55 ff.
30. George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little Brown,
1967), pp. 175, 261.
31. "The Nuremberg Judgment," editorial, The Economist
(London), Oct. 5, 1946, p. 532.; See also: J. McMillan, Five Men
at Nuremberg, pp. 67, 173-174, 380, 414 f.
32. Marguerite Higgins, "Russian Quotes Allied Sanction of
Deportations," New York Herald Tribune, Nov. 14, 1946.
33. James Bacque, Other Losses (Toronto: Stoddart, 1989). See
especially pp. 26-28.
34. Quoted in: Wolf R. Hess, My Father Rudolf Hess (London:
1986), pp. 392 f.
35. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression ("red series"),
NC&A, vol. 1, p. vi (preface).; William L. Shirer, The Rise
and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: 1960), pp. ix, x.
36. Lucy Dawidowicz, A Holocaust Reader (New York: Behrman,
1976), pp. 2-3.; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression ("red
series"), NC&A, vol. 1, p. vi. See also: C. Mattogno,
"Myth," Journal of Historical Review, Summer 1988, pp.
133-134.; John Mendelsohn, "The Holocaust: Records in the
National Archives . . .," Prologue (Washington, DC: National
Archives), Spring 1984, pp. 23 ff. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction
of the European Jews (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), pp.
1224-27.
37. Alfred M. de Zayas, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau (Lincoln:
1990), pp. 238 f.
38. Leon Poliakov, Harvest of Hate (New York: Holocaust Library,
1979), p. 108.; Princeton University history professor Arno Mayer
wrote that "authentic documents about the making,
transmission, and implementation of the extermination
policy" are "rare." Arno J. Mayer, Why Did the
Heavens Not Darken? (New York: 1989), p. 363.
39. W. Maser, Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial (1979), pp. 97, 98,
99, 272, 273-274, 331 (n. 50).; Plea by attorney Dr. Alfred Seidl
in: Udo Walendy, ed., Auschwitz im IG-Farben Prozess (Vlotho:
1981), pp. 380, 383.; Hildegard Springer (Hans Fritzsche), Das
Schwert auf der Waage (Heidelberg: K. Vowinckel, 1953), p. 112.;
John Mendelsohn, "Trial by Document," Prologue
(Washington, DC: National Archives), Winter 1975, esp. pp.
230-231.; Richard Pemsel, Hitler (Tübingen: 1986), pp. 87-89,
104.; IMT defense attorney Dr. H. Pelckmann protested against the
"disappearance" of important defense documents:
International Military Tribunal "blue series," vol. 21
(pp. 383-409 of German-language IMG edition). Quoted in: U.
Walendy, ed., "L_gen um Heinrich Himmler," II. Teil,
Historische Tatsachen Nr. 47 (Vlotho: 1991), p. 32.; On the
protests of defense attorneys about some of these difficulties,
see: Carlos Porter, Made in Russia: The Holocaust (1988), pp.
242-244, 248, 249, 252-256.
40. Karl Hoeffkes, ed., Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimverbindungen
(1988), pp. 28-30.; R. Pemsel, Hitler (T_bingen: 1986), p. 104.
41. W. Maser, Nuremberg (1979), p. 199.
42. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression ("red series"),
NC&A, Vol. 1, p. 9.; Jay W. Baird, ed., From Nuremberg to My
Lai (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1972), pp. 16-17.
43. Documents 159-L (USA-222) and PS-3311 (USA-293). Published
in: IMT ("blue series"), vol. 37, p. 621, and, IMT,
vol. 32, pp. 153-158.
44. IMT ("blue series"), vol. 1, p. 54.; IMT, vol. 7,
pp. 425-427.; A. de Zayas, Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau (1990),
pp. 228-239.; J. McMillan, Five Men at Nuremberg, pp. 51, 67,
222.; R. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, pp. 66-67, 452-455.;
Document USSR-54 is published in IMT ("blue series"),
vol. 39, pp. 290-332.; See also: C. Porter, Made in Russia: The
Holocaust (1988), pp. 100-120, 229, 230, 234-235.; R. Faurisson,
"Katyn a Nuremberg," Revue d'Histoire R_visionniste,
No. 2, Aug.-Oct. 1990, pp. 138 ff.
45. New York Times, April 13 and 14, 1990.
46. Dorothy Rabinowitz, About the Holocaust (New York: 1979), p.
6.; A. Suzman and D. Diamond, Six Million Did Die (Johannesburg:
1978), pp. 33, 34, 35.
47. Internationally respected historian Werner Maser has noted
"the existence of forged documents" at Nuremberg. W.
Maser, Nuremberg, p. 98.; See also: Ingrid Weckert, Feuerzeichen
(T_bingen: 1981), pp. 151, 155, 171.; After the war, Eichmann
also expressed the view that some purported documents are
fraudulent. See: Rudolf Aschenauer, ed., Ich, Adolf Eichmann
(1980), p. 153.
48. IMT ("blue series"), vol. 22, pp. 148 f.; See: C.
Porter, Made in Russia (1988), pp. 269-270, 410-411.; Defendant
Baldur von Schirach, wartime Gauleiter of Vienna, complained that
another prosecution document was fraudulent: IMT ("blue
series"), vol. 14, p. 451.; Defendant Göring and attorney
Stahmer objected to another document: IMT, vol. 9, pp. 610 f.
49. M. Weber, "Simon Wiesenthal," Journal of Historical
Review, Winter 1989-1990, p. 443.
50. Cited or quoted in: IMT ("blue series"), vol. 7,
pp. 442-443; vol. 14, pp. 518-519; vol. 19, pp. 256-259, 437-438,
494-495, 498; vol. 24, p. 182.
51. W. Malanowski, Der Spiegel, Sept. 7, 1985, pp. 92 ff.; M.
Weber, "Swiss Historian Exposes . . .," Journal of
Historical Review, Fall 1983 (Vol. 4, No. 3), pp. 378-380.; H. W.
Koch, ed., Aspects of the Third Reich (New York: St. Martin's,
1985), pp. 13 f.; "Antideutscher Schwindel-Verleger
gestorben," D. National-Zeitung (Munich), Jan. 24, 1992, p.
9.
52. Dankwart Kluge, Das Hossbach - 'Protokoll' (1980).; M. Weber,
Journal of Historical Review, Fall 1983 (Vol. 4, No. 3), pp. 372
ff.; A.J.P. Taylor, An Old Man's Diary (London: 1984), p. 154.
(Taylor added: "No evidence that Hitler planned aggressive
war has ever been produced . . . [This] revision upsets the
entire verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which is still solemnly
quoted as justification of the Allied war against
Germany.").
53. Heath W. Lowry, "The U.S. Congress and Adolf Hitler on
the Armenians," Political Communication and Persuasion, Vol.
3, No. 2, 1985. Reprinted in: Armenian Allegations: Myth and
Reality (Washington, DC: 1986), pp. 119-132.; See also the
letters by Dr. Robert John in the New York Times, June 8 and July
6, 1985.
54. L. Dawidowicz, A Holocaust Reader (1976), p. 10.; In her 1981
book, The Holocaust and the Historians (pp. 100-101), Dawidowicz
wrote of the case of Polish-Jewish historian Ber(nard) Mark,
Director of the Jewish Historical Institute of Warsaw and author
of several Holocaust books. She charged that he had falsified
Holocaust sources. Another Jewish historian, Michel Borwicz,
similarly charged in 1962 that Ber Mark was a falsifier
("transformer") of documents. See: M. Borwicz, Revue
d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale (Paris), No. 45, Jan.
1962, p. 93.
55. Raul Hilberg has noted that Martin Gilbert's 1985 book, The
Holocaust, relies heavily on such questionable testimony. See
interview with Hilberg in: "Recording the Holocaust,"
Jerusalem Post International Edition, week ending June 28, 1986,
pp. 8, 9.; On the general unreliability of "witness
testimony," see Witness for the Defense (by E. Loftus &
K. Ketcham), reviewed by John Cobden in The Journal of Historical
Review, Summer 1991 (Vol. 11, No. 2), pp. 238-249.
56. Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution (London: Sphere books,
pb., 1971), p. 581.
57. Jean-Claude Pressac, Auschwitz : Technique and Operation of
the Gas Chambers (1989), p. 23.
58. H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Compass/Viking,
1965), p. 224.
59. L. Dawidowicz, A Holocaust Reader (1976), p. 11.; Jewish
Holocaust historian Gitta Sereny has complained about those who
have simply "invented Holocaust events." See: G.
Sereny, New Statesman (London), July 17, 1981, p. 17.
60. G. Tillion, "Le Systeme concentrationnaire
allemand," Revue de l'histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre
mondiale, July 1954. (Quoted in: IHR Newsletter, No. 59, July
1988, pp. 5, 6.)
61. Jewish Social Studies (New York: Conference on Jewish
Relations), Jan. 1950, Vol. 12, pp. 65-66.
62. B. Amouyal, "Doubts over evidence of camp
survivors," Jerusalem Post (Israel), August 17, 1986, p. 1.;
Similarly, many American imposters have falsely but convincingly
claimed heroic participation in pitched battles or involvement in
horrific atrocities during the Vietnam war. See: "Fighting
Lies for Vietnam: Phony Soldiers," The Washington Times,
June 4, 1990, pp. D1, D5.; "Imitation Vietnam
Syndrome," Baltimore Sun, March 20, 1988, pp. 1E, 5E.
63. R. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, p. 454.; A. de Zayas,
Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau (1990), pp. 230-235.
64. Sworn and notarized statement by Pinter, Feb. 9, 1960.
Facsimile in: Erich Kern, ed., Verheimlichte Dokumente (Munich:
1988), p. 429.; Note also Pinter report in Der Weg, No. 8, 1954,
reprinted in: U. Walendy, ed., "Politkriminologie,"
Historische Tatsachen Nr. 43 (Vlotho: 1990), pp. 20 ff.
65. Freda Utley, The High Cost of Vengeance (Chicago: Regnery,
1949), p. 195.
66. Written declaration of A. Gross, in: Erich Kern, Meineid
gegen Deutschland (1971), p. 264.
67. J. Halow, "Innocent at Dachau," The Journal of
Historical Review, Winter 1989-1990, pp. 459-483. ; Halow deals
with this entire issue in greater detail in his book, Innocent at
Dachau, to be published by the IHR. In 1948 German bishop Dr.
Johannes Neuh_usler, who been interned for several years in the
Sachsenhausen and Dachau camps during the war, condemned the use
of such "professional witnesses" in American run
trials, and cited a particularly blatant example. M_nchner
Katholische Kirchenzeitung, Nov. 7, 1948. Quoted in: D.
National-Zeitung (Munich), Dec. 13, 1985, p. 6.
68. "Major Poullada's Final Defense Plea in the
Nordhausen-Dora Concentration Camp Case," Journal of
Historical Review, Spring 1991 (Vol. 11, No. 1), pp. 81-119.
69. Letter by former OSI director Walter J. Rockler, National Law
Journal, Dec. 8, 1980, p. 14.; See also: B. Amouyal,
"Treblinka witnesses were discredited," Jerusalem Post
- International Edition, Week ending April 5, 1986.
70. "Nazi Hunter Looks for Witnesses, Finds Hucksters,"
Jewish Press (Brooklyn, NY), Dec. 4, 1981, p. 2.
71. "The Nazi Who Never Was," The Washington Post, May
10, 1981, pp. B5, B8.; Michael Arndt, "The Wrong Man,"
Sunday, The Chicago Tribune Magazine, Dec. 2, 1984, pp. 15- 35.;
Kirk Makin, "Media distorted . . .," The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), Feb. 15, 1985, pp. M1, M3.
72. Emil Lachout, an Austrian officer who served with the postwar
Allied War Crimes Commission, testified under oath in a 1988
court case that German officials had been tortured to produce
fraudulent statements about alleged killings of Jews in German
camp gas chambers. He also provided what he said was a copy of a
1948 document confirming this. See: Robert Lenski, Holocaust on
Trial (1990), pp. 274, 278.; M_ller circular notice, Oct. 1,
1948, published in: Journal of Historical Review, Spring 1988,
pp. 117-124.
73. Rupert Butler, Legions of Death (England: 1983), pp.
235-239.; R. Faurisson, "How the British Obtained the
Confessions of Rudolf H_ss," Journal of Historical Review,
Winter 1986-1987, pp. 389-403.
74. H_ss statement, April 5, 1946. Document 3868-PS (USA-819).;
H_ss statement, May 20, 2946. Document NI-034.; H_ss testimony at
the Nuremberg Tribunal, published in: IMT ("blue
series"), vol. vol. 33, pp. 275-279 ; NC&A ("red
series"), vol. 6, pp. 787-790.
75. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago I-II (New York:
Harper & Row, 1974), p. 112 (n. 15).
76. IMT ("blue series"), vol. 15, pp. 64-68.
77. IMT ("blue series"), vol. 17, p. 214.; K. Heiden,
"Why They Confess," Life magazine, June 20, 1949, pp.
92 ff. (During the trial Fritzsche recanted his forced
statement.)
78. W. Maser, Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial (1979), pp. 51-52, 47,
60.; K. Stimely, "The Torture of Julius Streicher,"
Journal of Historical Review, Spring 1984, pp. 106-119.;
"Streicher Case Opens," The Times (London), April 27,
1946, p. 3.; Rupert Butler, Legions of Death (England: 1983), pp.
238-239.; Montgomery Belgion, Victor's Justice (Regnery, 1949),
p. 90.
79. Montgomery Belgion, Victor's Justice (1949), pp. 80-81. Cited
in: A. Butz, Hoax of the Twentieth Century, p. 189.
80. Nuremberg "Case 8" presiding judge Wyatt took note
of the charges of torture. "During the course of the
trial," the American jurist declared, "several
witnesses, including some defendants, who made affidavits that
were offered as evidence by the prosecution, testified that they
were threatened, and that duress of a very improper nature was
practiced by an interrogator." Nuremberg Military Tribunals,
Trials of the War Criminals . . . ("green series,"/
Washington, DC: 1949-1953), NMT, vol. 15, p. 879.
81. Letter by Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk written in Essen, April
15, 1975, shortly before his death. Published in: Die
Bauernschaft (Mohrkirch), April 1981, pp. 34-35.; Freda Utley,
The High Cost of Vengeance (Chicago: Regnery, 1949), p. 172.; T.
Bower, Blind Eye to Murder (1983), p. 314.; "US Ankl_ger
Kempner schwer belastet," Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung, Feb. 23,
1973. Cited in: Austin App, No Time for Silence (IHR, 1987), p.
17.
82. John Toland, Adolf Hitler (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976),
p. 774.; Karlheinz Pintsch, an adjutant of Hitler's deputy Rudolf
Hess, was tortured for months by the Soviet secret police in
Moscow in an effort to force him to sign a statement designed to
incriminate Hess. In spite of his cruel treatment, Pintsch never
gave in. Wolf R. Hess, My Father Rudolf Hess (London: 1986), p.
62.
83. Milch sworn statement, April 9, 1947. Quoted in: E. Kern,
ed., Verheimlichte Dokumente (1988), p. 400.
84. R. Wistrich, Who's Who in Nazi Germany (New York: Bonanza,
1984), p. 210.
85. On Dachau trial abuses see: Freda Utley, The High Cost of
Vengeance (Chicago: Regnery, 1949), pp. 185-200.; Judge Edward L.
van Roden, "American Atrocities in Germany," The
Progressive, Feb. 1949, pp. 21-22. Reprinted in: The
Congressional Record - Appendix, Vol. 95, Sec. 12, (March 10,
1949), pp. A1365-66.; Dachau trial defense attorney Lt. Col.
Willis M. Everett, Jr., reviewed prosecution methods in a
petition submitted to the Supreme Court. Complete text in: The
Congressional Record - Senate, Vol. 95, Sec. 2, (March 10, 1949),
pp. 2159-2165. Important excerpts were published in: The
Congressional Record - Appendix, Vol. 95, Sec. 13, (April 5,
1949), pp. A-2065-67. Also useful are: Montgomery Belgion,
Victor's Justice (Regnery, 1949).; Reginald T. Paget, Manstein:
His Campaigns and His Trial (London: 1951).
86. J. Halow, "Innocent at Dachau," Journal of
Historical Review, Winter 1989-90, p. 459.; See also: T. Bower,
Blind Eye to Murder, pp. 304, 310, 313.
87. J. Halow, "Innocent at Dachau," Journal of
Historical Review, Winter 1989-90 (Vol. 9, No. 4), pp. 452-483.
Note especially pp. 478-482 (G. Petrat statement of Sept. 10,
1948).
88. "Korean War," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1973
edition, Vol. 13, p. 474.; Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty
(1975), p. 355.
89. Legal brief for Oswald Pohl ("Grundz_ge des Systems der
Deutschen Konzentrationslager und Bemerkungen zum Urteil des
Milit_rtribunals II gegen Oswald Pohl"), pp. 23-27. Compiled
(in 1948?) by defense attorney Dr. Alfred Seidl. Copy provided to
the author in 1990 by the defendant's grandson, Fritjof Pohl.; W.
Maser, Nuremberg (1979), p. 100.; See also Oswald Pohl's written
statement of June 1, 1948, cited below.
90. Written statement by Pohl, June 1, 1948. Deutsche
Hochschullehrerzeitung (T_bingen), Nr. 1/2, 1963, pp. 21-26.
Reprinted in: U. Walendy, ed., "L_gen um Heinrich Himmler,
II. Teil," Historische Tatsachen Nr. 47 (Vloth: 1991), pp.
35-40.; Although I have not been able to obtain a copy of the
original text of Pohl's 1948 statement, its essential accuracy
can be confirmed by comparing it with the text of the legal brief
(cited above) compiled by his attorney, Dr. Siedl. Fritjof Pohl
(Oswald Pohl's grandson) and Wigbert Grabert (son of the
editor-publisher of the Deutsche Hochschullehrerzeitung) have
also confirmed the authenticity of Pohl's 1948 statement.
91. W. Maser, Nuremberg (New York: 1979), p. 100.
92. W. Maser, Nuremberg, p. 175.
93. Nuremberg Military Tribunal, NMT ("green series"),
Vol. 5, p. 934.
94. R. Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews (1985), p.
1067.; R. Faurisson, "Response," Journal of Historical
Review, Spring 1986, p. 40.; J. Heydecker and J. Leeb, Der
N_rnberger Prozess (Cologne: 1958), pp. 489 ff. Cited in: W.
St_glich, Der Auschwitz-Mythos (1979), p. 104.; See also: R.
Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, p. 514. According to a recent
editorial in the San Francisco Examiner ("Holocaust
disbelievers," March 30, 1992), "Not a single war
criminal tried at Nuremberg offered as a defense, 'It didn't
happen', they said they were "only following orders."
95. IMT ("blue series"), vol. 9, pp. 611, 612, 619.;
Wm. L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York:
1960), p. 964, footnote.; During a conversation in early 1946
with his defense attorney, Göring said: "I really knew
nothing about the mass murder of Jews." Quoted by a young
lawyer who was an assistant to Göring's defense attorney, Dr.
Stahmer, in: Gespr_che mit Hermann Göring w_hrend des N_rnberger
Prozesses, Teil I (W. Germany: 1950 and reprint. no date, no
place), p. 15. (Conversation on Jan. 12, 1946).; See also: David
Irving, Göring (New York: 1989), p. 469.
96. Hans Fritzsche (H. Springer), The Sword in the Scales
(London: A. Wingate, 1953), pp. 144-145. German edition: Das
Schwert auf der Waage (Heidelberg: K. Vowinckel, 1953), p. 118.
97. IMT ("blue series"), vol. 15, pp. 332-333. Also
quoted in: J. McMillan, Five Men at Nuremberg, pp. 239-240.; See
also the similar testimonies of: Radio commentator and propaganda
ministry official Hans Fritzsche: A. de Zayas, Wehrmacht War
Crimes Bureau (1990), p. 111.; Economics minister Walter Funk:
IMT ("blue series"), vol. 22, pp. 387 f.; Minister for
the occupied Soviet territories Alfred Rosenberg: IMT, vol. 22,
p. 382.; Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop: R. Conot, Justice at
Nuremberg, p. 54.; Foreign Office State Secretary Ernst von
Weizs_cker: NMT, vol. 13, pp. 437, 443, 445.; Note also
statements by officials Stuckart, Klopfer, Leibbrandt, and
Kritzinger, in: Robert Kempner, Eichmann und Komplizen (Zurich:
1961), pp. 151-160.; Documents PL-54 and PL-64 in: IMT
("blue series"), vol. 42, pp. 348, 385.
98. IMT ("blue series"), vol. 12, pp. 17-19.; See also
the testimony of Joseph B_hler, who worked closely with Frank for
many years: IMT, vol. 12, pp. 64, 69, 70.; Note also: R.
Faurisson, "Challenge," Journal of Historical Review,
Winter 1984, pp. 298 f.
99. IMT ("blue series"), vol. 12, p. 13. German text
quoted in: Richard Pemsel, Hitler (T_bingen: 1986), p. 317.
100. Final sentence quoted by British prosecutor Shawcross at
Nuremberg: IMT ("blue series"), vol. 19, p. 433, and
in: W. Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960), p. vii.;
Entire passage quoted in: R. Hilberg, Destruction of the European
Jews (1985), p. 1055.; R. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, p. 380.
101. IMT ("blue series"), vol. 22, p. 385. German text
quoted in: R. Pemsel, Hitler (1986), p. 129.; Postwar criminal
mistreatment of the Germans by the Allies is dealt with in
Gruesome Harvest by Ralph F. Keeling, and in Nemesis at Potsdam
by Alfred de Zayas.
102. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression ("red series"),
Suppl. vol. B, pp. 1306-1307, 1299. See also: IMT, vol. 22, pp.
378-379.; Hans Fritzsche (H. Springer), The Sword in the Scales
(London: Wingate, 1953), pp. 182-187.
103. Matthias Schmidt, Albert Speer: The End of a Myth (New York:
1985), pp. 194-195. See also: M. Weber, "Albert Speer and
the Holocaust," Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1984,
p. 439.; M. Weber, "Legal Declaration," Journal of
Historical Review, Spring 1982, pp. 42-43.; A. Butz, Hoax of the
Twentieth Century, pp. 179-180.; Henry A. Turner, Jr., "The
Nazi Who Made a Comeback," The New York Times Book Review,
March 3, 1985, pp. 9-10.
104. NMT ("green series"), vol. 13, pp. 421, 430.; See
also Lammers' testimony in IMT ("blue series"), vol.
11, pp. 53, 115-116.; Lammers' career and the history of the
Reich Chancellery during the Third Reich is dealt with in: Georg
Franz-Willing, Der Reichskanzlei: 1933-1945 (Tübingen: 1984).
105. On the Moscow show trials, see: Robert Conquest, The Great
Terror (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 83-132, 468.;
Joseph E. Davies, Mission To Moscow (New York: Pocket Books,
1943), pp. 38-39.; Edward Crankshaw, ed., Khrushchev Remembers
(Boston: 1970), pp. 352-353.
106. H. Fritzsche, Es sprach Hans Fritzsche, p. 144. Quoted in:
R. Pemsel, Hitler (1986), p. 167.
107. See Wilhelm Staeglich's useful analysis of the trial,
Auschwitz: A Judge Looks at the Evidence (IHR, 1990), especially
chapter four. (German-language edition: Der Auschwitz-Mythos,
1979).; See also: Konnilyn Feig, Hitler's Death Camps (New York:
1981), p. 365.
108. Bernd Naumann, Auschwitz (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp.
8-26, 416-417. Quoted in: A. Butz, Hoax of the Twentieth Century,
pp. 187-188.
109. "Belastende Aussage angeblich unter Alkohol,"
Frankfurter Rundschau, July 7, 1964, p. 7.; "Der
Auschwitz-Prozess," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 7,
1964, p. 6.; "Lied About Auschwitz," Miami Herald (UPI
dispatch), July 7, 1964, p. 15-A or 4-D, depending on edition.
110. Cited by A. Butz in: "Perspective in the 'Holocaust'
Controversy," Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1982, p.
374, and in the 1983 US edition of Hoax of the Twentieth Century,
p. 338.; K. Feig reports in Hitler's Death Camps (1981), p. 365,
that all of the defendants were set free on appeal.
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